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ABSTRACT
Welfare in economics is generally conceived of in terms of the 
satisfaction of preferences, but a general, comparable index measure 
of welfare is generally not taken to be possible. In recent years, in 
response to the usage of measures of subjective well-being as indices 
of welfare in economics, a number of economists have started to 
develop measures of welfare based on preference-satisfaction. In 
order to evaluate the success of such measures, I formulate criteria of 
policy-relevance and theoretical success in the context of preference-
satisfaction measures of welfare. I present a detailed case study of 
the methodological choices put forward in a prominent generalized 
proposal for measuring welfare through preferences  recently 
published in the American Economic Review. I contrast this with an 
alternative welfare measure which also uses preferences to weight 
aspects of welfare: the ICECAP-A measure. I assess the methodology of 
both approaches in detail and argue that the two goals of a preference 
measure of welfare can only be satisfied at the expense of making a 
measure prohibitively costly.
1. Introduction
Since the second half of the twentieth-century welfare economics has been built upon the 
foundational assumption that welfare should be conceived of in terms of the satisfaction 
of preferences and that it is highly doubtful that preferences can result in a cardinal meas-
ures of welfare, or in measures that are interpersonally comparable (Binmore, 2009b; 
Colander, 2007). Lionel Robbins’ plea for expelling measures of psychological feelings of 
satisfaction out of the science of economics – for the reason that it failed to be scientifically 
measurable – is said to be pivotal in the formation of this view:
There is no means of testing the magnitude of A’s satisfaction as compared with B’s. If we tested the 
state of their blood-streams, that would be a test of blood, not satisfaction. Introspection does 
not enable A to discover what is going on in B’s mind, nor B to discover what is going on in A’s. 
(Robbins, 1932, p. 140 [original emphasis])
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2   W. VAN DER DEIJL
In response, it became an accepted view that rather than identifying welfare with pleasure, 
welfare should be conceptualized in terms of whether people get what they want. However, 
this concept of satisfaction of preferences is difficult to measure in a general fashion – capturing 
all that people care about, or at least all preferences that are affected by policy. While partial 
measures of welfare are sometimes used in cost-benefit analyses – such as QALY’s in the context 
of health-related utility – no overall, or generic, measures are generally taken to allow for mean-
ingful comparisons. Consequently, the consensus appears to be that while preferences may be 
used for partial comparisons of welfare, there can be no general preference-satisfaction measure 
of welfare that allows for interesting comparisons (see the Frey and Stutzer quote below).
However, in recent years, the attitude of economists towards the measurement of welfare 
has been shaken. A number of economists have incorporated insights from psychology and 
have taken psychological feelings of happiness and life-satisfaction to be measurable after 
all through self-reports – under the heading of subjective well-being (SWB henceforth; Clark, 
Frijters, & Shields, 2008; Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2006; Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2008; 
Kahneman & Krueger, 2006 and MacKerron, 2012 for an alternative approach to SWB meas-
urement of welfare). As Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer write:
Only a few years ago, most economists took it for granted that utility cannot possibly be meas-
ured, and not even reasonably be approximated. Things have dramatically changed: happiness 
research has made great progress, with economists playing a leading role. (2016, p. 21)
The view that these ‘happiness economists’ endorse either takes welfare to be constituted 
by happiness or life-satisfaction, or takes such measures to be good approximations of pref-
erence-satisfaction. Happiness economics has been growing expansively, but has also 
encountered much criticism (e.g. Barrotta, 2008; Fleurbaey & Blanchet, 2013; Hausman, 2010; 
Stewart, 2014; Sugden, 2008).1
This narrative so far is based on pragmatic reasons: Happiness made place for prefer-
ence-satisfactionism – or preferentism – as a central conception of welfare in economics 
because happiness was not considered measurable, while preference-satisfaction could be 
operationalized to some extent; only to shift back when happiness became considered 
measurable again. There is, however, also a deep philosophical disagreement on the nature 
of welfare between these two approaches. Welfare – or well-being (I will use these terms 
interchangeably) – is a term describing that which makes life good for the person who is 
living it (Sumner, 1996; Tiberius, 2006). While both happiness-based theories of well-being 
(such as hedonism) and preference-satisfaction theories have used ‘utility’ as a term to 
describe the good, they are quite different. Happiness-based theories locate well-being in 
psychological states, be it in terms of good feelings – in case of hedonism – or life-satisfaction 
– for life-satisfaction theories. Preference-satisfaction theories are, different from hedonism, 
not mental-state accounts of welfare. While preferences are mental-states, the satisfaction 
of preference is not (Griffin, 1986). Welfare, on a preference-satisfaction account represents 
the extent to which the world corresponds with how one wants it to be. On this account, 
regardless of how strongly it influences a person’s sense of happiness or satisfaction, when-
ever a preference is satisfied, welfare is, ceteris paribus, increased. Much of the disagreement 
between the happiness-based and preference-satisfaction conceptions of well-being has 
focused on this contention (cf. Heathwood, 2006).
This paper is concerned with one particular reply to the trend to measure welfare in terms 
of happiness, which has come from economists who endorse the view that welfare should 
be conceived of in terms of preferences rather than in terms of happiness or life-satisfaction, 
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JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY  3
and do not believe that the latter are necessarily good proxies of the former. Namely, the 
response that rejects happiness measures because they do not (necessarily) cohere with 
people’s preference-satisfaction, but that, despite skepticism on theoretical grounds 
(Hausman, 1995; List, 2003; see Binmore, 2009a), welfare can nevertheless be measured in 
practice by means of eliciting people’s preferences, and measuring the extent of their satis-
faction. The most prominent example of such criticism comes from Benjamin, Heffetz, 
Kimball, and Szembrot (2014) who argue that: ‘widely-used SWB measures may not capture 
all factors that enter into preferences’ (Benjamin et al., 2014, p. 2700). In reaction, they are 
revising the age-old skepticism about the possibility to measure preference-satisfaction 
meaningfully on an individual, general level. Benjamin et al. formulate a general formal 
framework and related measurement methodology for measuring a preference-based 
well-being index, novel in its aim to measure welfare comprehensively.
The purpose of this article is to investigate the success of this response; not, however, in 
terms of the plausibility of the underlying theory of well-being, but in terms of the success of 
the claim that a preference-satisfactionist account of welfare can feasibly be developed into 
an individual index measure of well-being. There are a range of reasons for why preference- 
satisfaction may or may not be a plausible candidate for a measure of well-being – particularly 
in the context of policy. One could hold against Benjamin et al. that preferences may be oth-
er-regarding, immoral (Hausman, 2012, ch. 7; Heathwood, 2010),2 and the satisfaction of pref-
erences need not feel good, or may go completely unnoticed (Parfit, 1984), and as such, are 
implausible to serve as a basis of an account of welfare, particularly in the realm of policy. On 
the other hand, it may be defended by suggesting that even if preference-satisfactionism is 
not a plausible theory of well-being in light of these problems, preference-satisfaction may 
still be seen as good evidence for welfare (Hausman, 2012, ch. 8). Moreover, there is space to 
bite the bullet on these concerns (Lukas, 2009), and the subjectivity of the measures may be 
seen as an advantage in the policy context as it limits the concern that the measure is based 
on a paternalistic notion of welfare (Haybron & Tiberius, 2015). However, putting aside con-
ceptional problems with preferentism, and regardless of some deeper theoretical concerns 
about the possibility of developing a preference-based utility index, the main contribution of 
this article is to argue that an individual well-being index based on preferences would be so 
data-demanding given its basic theoretical commitments, that it would be practically infeasible 
as a useful tool for policy. These theoretical commitments involve individualism about pref-
erences – the preferences used to asses my well-being should be my preferences – and unre-
strictedness with respect to preferences – the set of preferences that count towards my 
well-being should not exclude preferences that I may plausibly have, and that would count 
towards my well-being.
To make this argument, I assess the empirical strategies of Benjamin et al.’s approach in 
order to see how they deal with measuremental challenges. I contrast their approach with 
an alternative way to use preferences in a general welfare measure. The ICEpop CAPability 
measure for Adults – or ICECAP-A (Al-Janabi, Flynn, & Coast, 2012; Al-Janabi et al., 2013; Flynn 
et al., 2015) – is a ‘generic measure of well-being that can be used across health and other 
areas of public provision of goods and services’ (Flynn et al., 2015, p. 267). Different from 
Benjamin et al.’s methodology, the ICECAP-A uses the preference-approach to welfare prag-
matically – as a proxy for people’s valuation – and is neither committed to individualism nor 
unrestrictedness. However, it nevertheless faces methodological challenges that shed light 
on the data-demandingness of certain methodological choices in measuring preferences.
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4   W. VAN DER DEIJL
The discussion of the used empirical strategies and choices in both approaches illustrates 
the methodological challenges that a preference-measure is faced with. Not only does this 
discussion clarify the issues at hand in a concrete context, but also takes seriously the context 
of the development of concrete measures, in which theoretical problems may be tackled 
by pragmatic choices. Importantly, however, the main aim of the article is not to criticize the 
pragmatic choices that researchers make to operationalize preference-satisfactionism. 
Rather, it is to illustrate the trade-offs involved in staying faithful to the theoretical commit-
ments of preferentism in the concrete context of developing welfare measures.
Section 2 discusses the very idea of preference-measures of welfare, and the meaning of 
policy-relevance and theoretical commitments in this context, Section 3 discusses the two 
case studies in detail, and Section 4 draws more general conclusions from this discussion with 
respect to the feasibility of measuring welfare through preferences. Section 5 concludes.
2. Measuring preference-based welfare, the very idea
The idea that welfare is constituted by preference-satisfaction comes with a number of 
commitments. Preference-satisfaction theory is sometimes called a formal theory of welfare 
(Tiberius, 2004), as it does not substantively take position on any specific good, but rather 
leaves individuals to be the author of what is good for them. An important underlying moti-
vation for the formal nature of preference-satisfaction accounts is a strong anti-paternalistic 
intuition that the individual should be the ultimate judge on what makes her life good. A 
well-known formulation of this idea by Peter Railton is that: ‘it would be an intolerably alien-
ated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it may fail in any way to engage him’ 
(Railton, 1986; see also Fletcher, 2013; Yelle, 2014). By making well-being solely dependent 
on what we want, it is impossible that we judge someone to be well on the basis of things 
that they do not care about. This liberal conception of well-being is the core theoretical 
commitment of the approach.
On the concrete level of measurement, this implies two things. Firstly, the measure should 
be individualistic. That is, a preference-satisfaction measure of an individual’s welfare should 
be based on her preferences, and not on the preferences or values of the group she is a part 
of, arm-chair philosophers, or policy-makers. Secondly, the space of things people may have 
preferences over, should not be restricted. If it is the case that people have strong preferences 
over the success of their football team, such preferences should have a place in a general 
measure of welfare. More precisely, while some preference-based conceptions of welfare may 
exclude preferences on formal grounds (such as unstable desires, Chekola, 2007), it could not 
do so on substantive grounds (such as seeming silly, like Rawls, 1971’s famous grass-counter’s 
desires).3 These two concrete commitments that follow from the liberal commitments of 
preference-satisfactionism we can call individualism and unrestrictedness, respectively.
What does it mean to measure welfare through preferences? The kind of things people 
have preferences over can be represented as a finite set of dimensions of welfare. To make 
this precise, consider the following general formalization of welfare:
 
where Wi is an individual welfare function for individual i, wi a vector of elements that con-
stitute welfare for i, and fi a function that describes how these combine into a welfare value. 
(1)Wi ≡ fi
(
w
i
)
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JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY  5
For example, hedonism can be characterized in this way, where fi = f is a linear function, 
while wi = w is a vector of one element, namely pleasure,
4 while in case of objective list 
theories wi = w, contains a number of elements that contribute to people’s well-being in 
some way, fi = f.
5 Preference-satisfaction can be represented in two equivalent ways. In a 
limited form, it can be expressed as a version of (1) in which wi has one element, si: the extent 
to which one’s preferences are satisfied, where fi = f is a linear unindexed function. 
Equivalently, we can also say that fi(wi) is a completely individualized version in which both 
the contents of wi as well as the way they are combined are fully determined by the structure 
of a person’s preferences:
 
A measure of welfare is thus one that represents Wpi somehow. Such measures can differ in 
various ways, allowing for different types of comparisons. Most significantly, a measure of 
Wpi may be used to make comparisons between individuals, or within individuals over time. 
Because empirical work on the measurement of welfare aims to guide policy, it is useful to 
look at possible aims of well-being policy. Assuming that a policy-maker is interested in the 
well-being of affected citizen when comparing two alternative policy actions to the status 
quo, a policy-maker would be interested in total welfare effects, but also in where in the 
distribution the changes in welfare lie.
In the ideal case, measures of preference-satisfaction – henceforth, simply utility – are 
cardinally interpretable and interpersonally interpretable (see Table 1). If this is the case, a 
policy-maker can evaluate the degree and equality of welfare in the current state, and the 
effect of policies on both. In a less ideal case, utility can be compared across individuals, but 
only provides ordinal information. In this case, the worst-off in society can be identified, but 
the magnitudes of changes for different individuals cannot be compared. However, it may 
also be the case that a measure is cardinal, but not interpersonally comparable. In these 
cases, its policy relevance depends on whether the differences between utility scores – utility 
units – can be meaningfully compared. If units of utility can be made compared, but levels 
cannot, aggregated changes in welfare can be estimated, even though the distribution of 
welfare cannot be identified. This thus allows for utilitarian considerations in policy-making. 
If units of utility cannot be made comparable between individuals, it may still be the case 
that for every individual the units represent the same changes in utility – i.e. each individual 
has her own cardinal scale. For policy purposes, this is the worst situation, together with the 
case that the measures are neither cardinal, nor interpersonally comparable. In both these 
cases, welfare indices would be able to indicate whether the welfare of individuals has 
increased or decreased, but not how welfare of different individuals compares, nor how the 
aggregate magnitude of such welfare changes compares to other welfare changes.
(2)Wpi ≡ fsi = fi
(
w
i
)
Table 1. level and comparability of preference-satisfaction measures.
  Cardinal Ordinal
interpersonal 
comparability
Ideal: both the magnitude of welfare 
changes and their impact on 
inequality can be assessed.
relative positions, such as the worst-off, can be identified, 
but nothing can be said about the magnitude of 
interpersonal or intrapersonal utility differences.
no interpersonal 
comparability
If differences comparable: utilitarian 
considerations
ordinal individual intrapersonal judgments
If differences not comparable: individual 
intrapersonal judgments
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6   W. VAN DER DEIJL
The relationship between the comparability levels of measures and policy evaluation is 
best illustrated with an example. Consider a policy-maker who has the option between 
keeping the status quo or doing policy A that affects Erik and Sophie. There is a measure of 
utility that is 6 for Erik and 8 for Sophie. We know that doing A would increase Erik’s utility 
by 1, while it would decrease Sophie’s utility by .5. In case the measure can be interpreted 
cardinally and is interpersonally comparable, we can see that the situation brings Erik and 
Sophie closer together, while improving aggregate welfare. In case they are ordinal and 
interpersonally comparable, we can see that Erik is worst-off, but we have no idea how 
Sophie’s decrease compares in magnitude to Erik’s. In case the utility measure is cardinal but 
levels of welfare are incomparable (and changes are comparable), we can see that A improves 
overall welfare, though we do not know if it equalizes the distribution. In the worst case – an 
ordinal measure that is not interpersonally comparable (or a cardinal measure of which 
neither the differences nor levels are comparable) – we know A improves Erik’s welfare and 
decreases Sophie’s, but we cannot say how this changes the distribution of welfare, nor 
whether Erik’s increase is larger or smaller than Sophie’s decrease. The cardinality and com-
parability thus jointly make up the policy-relevance of utility measures of welfare.
A final consideration is feasibility of measures. Any measure of welfare, but particularly 
ones that are to be used to inform policy, should not be overly demanding on either respond-
ents or government offices conducting them. In particular, in the discussion that follows, 
the term feasibility will be used to distinguish between welfare measures that use data that 
can be obtained through reasonably long questionnaires (or other informational bases) and 
measures that require so much information from individuals that measurement would be 
prohibitively costly; in particular for the individual being evaluated.
3. In practice
Benjamin et al. (2014) motivate their article by describing ‘the principle of revealed prefer-
ence’ as the cornerstone of economics: ‘the ultimate criterion for judging what makes a 
person better off is what she chooses’ (2014, p. 2698). However, while in some economic 
instances this principle may be informative, in particular in the policy context, people do 
not always make choices about options that may matter for their well-being. The aim of their 
paper is to provide an index of preferences to serve as an indicator of well-being in particu-
larly these contexts. More precisely, they want to develop: ‘an individual-level index that 
combines together different aspects of well-being that may be measured by survey ques-
tions’ (2014, p. 2699)
They acknowledge and appreciate SWB measures as a candidate for this purpose. However, 
while such measures may be multi-dimensional, the weights attached to these dimensions 
are generally assigned by researchers themselves, and are thus ‘ad hoc’ (2700). Consequently, 
a person can score high on such indices without this reflecting this person’s preference.
The article provides a theoretical framework as well as an empirical illustration of this 
framework, which results from a number of pragmatic choices. Theoretically, the proposal 
is based on the consumption theoretic framework in which changes in utility are assumed 
to be proportional to changes in consumed goods:
 
(3)Δu ∝
M∑
m=1
pmΔcm
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JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY  7
where M is the set of goods, m, consumed at price pm, and quantity cm. While this framework 
may be sufficient for assessing the impact of market transactions on welfare, the same does 
not apply to non-market goods, with which policy typically is engaged with. Thus, Benjamin 
et al. propose to broaden the framework accordingly. Rather than just market goods, they 
propose a welfare function exists out of a set w of welfare components, wj, over which people 
have preferences. Formally, this is captured by the following:
 
Intuitively, this captures the idea that over a given time period, the changes in welfare are 
given by all the changes in welfare components multiplied by their impact on welfare, which 
corresponds to how strongly they are preferred. So, if only health improves, while all the 
other welfare components remain the same, welfare changes just as much as how strongly 
the health improvement was preferred over alternatives.
Interestingly, the theoretical framework does not stop here, but in fact, the welfare index 
that is proposed is defined as follows6:
 
Compared to (4), the Δ is removed from before wj. In practice then, an empirical strategy to 
get at the index is to measure the 휕u(w) from a stated preference survey, while the wj’s should 
be obtained independently from, among other sources, SWB surveys. In the stated preference 
survey, respondents are asked to report what their preferences are between two options in 
which 1–3 aspects are altered positively, and 1–3 aspects are altered negatively, and they 
are asked whether the prefer either one of the options slightly, somewhat, or much.
Benjamin et al. (2014) acknowledge that ‘[s]ince the marginal utilities are defined only up 
to an arbitrary constant, so is the index’ (2014, pp. 2704–2705). As the index weighs the level 
of welfare components with their marginal relative utility, it can only sensibly compare 
changes in welfare within an individual over time. Even in the theoretical ideal that a full 
preference map can be made for a particular individual that maps the desirability of all the 
possible values of w, only ‘ordinal welfare comparisons could then be made between any of 
the individual’s SWB-survey occasions’ (2014, p. 2705). This indicates that even in the theo-
retical ideal, the index falls within the lower right corner of Table 1, with a highly limited 
policy-applicability.
However, in their proposed (and executed) empirical strategy, a number of pragmatic 
choices need to be made that complicate the validity of even such minimal intrapersonal 
ordinal comparisons.
3.1. Selection of aspects
The methodology Benjamin et al. propose to elicit preferences is a stated preference method. 
As a central part of the method, respondents are asked to make hypothetical choices between 
aspects in w. This requires that that the elements of w are specified. This creates a challenge 
for Benjamin et al. After all, in order for the preference measure to be valid, it requires the 
(4)Δu =
J∑
j=1
휕u(w)
휕wj
Δwj
(5)Wbhks,i
J∑
j=1
휕u(w)
휕wj
wj
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8   W. VAN DER DEIJL
set of aspects of welfare to be ‘exhaustive’, as well as ‘non-overlapping’ (2014, p. 2707). 
Nevertheless, because they would not want their ‘ex-ante beliefs’ to be an influence, and 
because they would not want to miss out on any important aspects, they decide to create 
‘as comprehensive a list of candidate fundamental aspects as we practically can’ (2014, 
p. 2707). The constructed list is made up of philosophical lists (such as Nussbaum, 2000) and 
aspects of well-being from both the empirical and philosophical literature, such as SWB 
constructs, as well as some aspects the authors themselves contributed. Benjamin et al. 
acknowledge that this may lead to overlapping aspects on the list.
The resulting list contains 129 aspects, including, for example, ‘The extent to which 
humanity does things worthy of pride’, ‘The amount of pleasure in your life’, ‘Equality of 
income in your nation’, ‘You not feeling anxious’, and ‘People getting the rewards and pun-
ishments they deserve’ (2715–2718). They acknowledge that many of these may overlap. 
The amount of pleasure in one’s life and ‘you not feeling anxious’ is one such example. In 
order to abridge this list into non-overlapping aspects of welfare, Benjamin et al. propose a 
data-driven strategy (2014 appendix). They argue that when a combination of two aspects 
is considered less desirable to an individual than the sum of the two separate aspects, it 
implies an overlap, and one of the two aspects may have to be deleted from the list.
This methodological choice has an important theoretical attraction: it minimizes pater-
nalism with respect to the contents of wi, and thereby maximizes unrestrictedness.
7 However, 
it comes with a number of problems.8 The overlap between many of the concepts involved 
may very well be detected by the method proposed, but not clearly solved. Consider for 
example, the overlap between health and pleasure. Feeling pleasure, up to an extent, must 
surely be seen as part of being healthy, while at the same time being in bad health will affect 
how much pleasure one feels. The proposed method will thus quite likely find overlap 
between pleasure and health, but this certainly does not mean that these are fully separate 
aspects and that one of them should be dropped. Quite likely many items on the list will 
overlap in a similar fashion. A potential solution to avoid overlap is to rely on theoretically 
motivated lists, such as objective lists in philosophy (e.g. Griffin, 1986; see also Alkire, 2002). 
However, Benjamin et al. rightly argue that relying on such ex ante lists would be hostile to 
the unrestrictedness commitment of preference-satisfactionism.
3.2. Data-demandingness and pooling of preferences
Another problem arises from the large number of elements in w, namely, it now becomes 
effortful to map a person’s preferences. This would not only require an individual to rank 129 
aspects in life, but because no particular functional structure can be assumed a priori, the 
large possible set of all possible values of the elements in wi may take have to be compared 
vis-à-vis each other as whole. This means that the number of required comparisons to con-
struct a full preference map increases exponentially. The intuition behind this is that when 
one aspect, such as health, suddenly deteriorates, this may not only affect the relative impor-
tance of health improvements in comparison to other aspects, but it may also affect the 
preference someone has between other aspects, such as between lack of anxiety and your 
sense of achievement. Such a non-linear relationship between preferences over these aspects 
vastly increases the possible preference-comparisons required to construct a full prefer-
ence-map. This leads Benjamin et al. to a number of pragmatically motivated choices.
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Firstly, preferences are elicited only at the present level of values of w. This allows Benjamin 
et al. to limit themselves to asking respondents to make hypothetical trade-offs at the present 
level of w. This means that they need not ask respondents how they would make the trade-
off between anxiety and sense of achievement given that their health level is X, where X may 
vary from very close to very far from their actual level of health. Secondly, in order to over-
come the data-demandingness of the proposed theoretical framework, Benjamin et al. 
assume that preferences are locally linear, thus assuming away the non-linear effect just 
described. These assumptions, however, are highly restrictive. It excludes preferences that 
people plausibly may have. Nevertheless, even with these assumptions, deriving individual 
marginal utilities requires individuals to make large sets of comparisons in their proposed 
stated preference surveys.
The way Benjamin et al. overcome this difficulty is by pooling preferences across respond-
ents. This means that the responses from the hypothetical trade-offs are pooled together 
as if they all came from a single person. This heavily reduces the data-demandingness of the 
method, but such a method is equivalent to assuming a representative agent. As Benjamin 
et al. acknowledge, ‘[d]oing so is difficult to justify theoretically’ (2014, p. 2731). After all, in 
light of the individualistic commitment of the preference-satisfactionist approach, it is pecu-
liar to assume that all individuals have (roughly) the same preferences. Their proposed 
method to counter this concern is to identify different groups, or ‘types’ according to their 
demographic characteristics.
The general problem is also related to the large selection of welfare aspects. Because the 
number of welfare aspects Benjamin et al. consider is so large, constructing preference maps 
is very data-demanding, which in turn requires simplifying assumptions that are difficult to 
justify in light of the individualist commitment of the approach. The weights used to aggre-
gate the different welfare aspects in w may very well be substantially different from the 
weights that an individual would want. To see this, consider someone whose preferences 
deviate from typical responses from her type. For example, while everyone of her type cares 
a lot about their health and the well-being of their families, one person cares much more 
about a sense of achievement. Her aggregate welfare, Wi, will then be weighed by weights 
that do not at all resonate with her own preferences. Notably, even without attempting to 
develop a cardinal or interpersonally comparable measure of welfare, Benjamin et al. run 
into steep trade-offs between feasibility and theoretical commitments.
3.3. An alternative: ICECAP-A
An alternative preference-based specification of a welfare measure is provided by the 
ICECAP-A. Preference-based indicators have been widely used to evaluate outcomes in 
cost-benefit analyses, in particular in the field of health care. In health care health-related 
quality of life is generally evaluated with a well-known preference-based measure, the QALY. 
A QALY captures the utility of being in a particular health state.9 Health states can be defined 
in a number of dimensions. For example, a prominent measure (EQ-5D) uses: mobility, self-
care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression. Each of these is scaled from 
1 to 5, such that 13551 means that a health state comprises little mobility and much depres-
sion, medium self-care, but no pain and full ability to do usual activities. Nevertheless, the 
distinction between health-related quality of life and quality of life itself is not always clear, 
as the impact of decreased health states may affect a broad spectrum of aspects of our lives 
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10   W. VAN DER DEIJL
(Al-Janabi et al., 2012). In order to overcome such problems, a number of health economists 
have proposed measures of general welfare. One such measure is the ICECAP-A. The ICECAP-A 
is based on a capability framework, and as such rejects the use of individualistic preferences 
as a direct measure of welfare.10 Nevertheless, in order to operationalize the approach, Flynn 
et al. use what they call the ‘“Cookson’s compromise” in assuming that population values 
obtained from choice-based tasks can be used as evidence for valuation with the capability 
approach (Cookson, 2005)’ (Flynn et al., 2015, pp. 259–260). Effectively, like Benjamin et al., 
it uses preferences to assign weights to different welfare components.11 Like Benjamin 
et al.’s empirical proposal, it pools the noted preferences (Flynn et al., 2015). Both assume 
the framework in (2), and use stated hypothetical preferences to estimate f(·). However, there 
are a number of significant differences in the way the difficulties described above are 
addressed.
 First, rather than using a list that is as comprehensive as possible, the capability approach 
that the developers of ICECAP-A endorse allows them to limit their welfare goods to a care-
fully constructed concise list of five capabilities of an approximately equally high level of 
abstraction: stability, attachment, autonomy, achievement, and enjoyment. This list is not 
(only) informed by the academic literature, but extracted from structured interviews and 
focus groups (Al-Janabi et al., 2012). Secondly, Flynn et al. (2015) assume that their welfare 
measure can be calibrated between 0 (having no capabilities whatsoever) and 1 (having full 
capability). These two assumptions are arguably quite strong. It is restrictive to limit the set 
of w over which agents have preferences relevant for well-being to five capabilities. 
Nevertheless, if well-being were five-dimensional, it is not implausible to say that perfect 
well-being is reached if all these five dimensions are at their maximal levels. Al-Janabi et al. 
use a discrete choice-based valuational experiment, using best-worst scaling, in order to 
elicit preferences.12 This method, in combination with the two assumptions above, allow for 
a cardinal measure of welfare (or, the value of welfare).13 The measure ultimately presents a 
population level measure scaled from 0 to 1, in which each of the five capabilities affects 
well-being in an additive, but non-linear way. In other words, the difference between levels 
1 and 2 enjoyment, and levels 3 and 4 enjoyment is weighted differently, but these weights 
do not depend on the level of the other four capabilities. Would they have done so, then, 
this would greatly increase the data-demand. As Flynn et al. (2015) explain: ‘a DCE [discrete 
choice experiment] capable of estimating even only two-way interactions would have been 
prohibitively costly, in terms of sample size’.
 By filling out a questionnaire asking a respondent her five levels of capability, researchers 
can assign a welfare-value to the respondent on the basis of the weights from a popula-
tion-wide discrete-choice experiment. The cardinal and interpersonally comparable nature 
of the measure of welfare fits in the top left concern of Table 1, and as such has much poli-
cy-relevance. Not only does it allow identifying the worst-off in society in terms of this meas-
ure, but it also helps to identify the impact of different interventions, and it can help assess 
how welfare has developed over time. Moreover, if the estimated weights can be extrapo-
lated to other contexts,14 it does not require much data to estimate. However, while the 
measure only uses preferences as an estimate of individual valuation, as an individualistic 
measure of welfare, the policy-relevance comes at a high cost from a preference-satisfac-
tionist perspective. The methodology takes the population seriously in the determination 
of the welfare function, both in terms of its contents – the formulation of the five capabilities 
that make up w – as well as its weights. However, because population values are used, it fails 
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to meet the individualistic commitment inherent to preference-satisfactionism as an account 
of welfare. If someone has a different view than the rest of the population in terms of the 
weights and contents of the well-being measure, the welfare function may be alien to her, 
and it may be possible that a person is evaluated on a standard, without her endorsing the 
values on which this is based.
4. Steep trade-offs
We have identified a number of different dimensions on which preference-based welfare 
measure may differ:
(Q1)  Does it restrict the list over which one can have preferences?
(Q2)  Does it restrict the functional form of the preference function?
(Q3)  Does it use individual preferences or does it use preferences that are pooled across 
individuals to weigh welfare aspects?
(Q4)  Does it result in an ordinal or cardinal measure?
(Q5)  Does it result in an interpersonally comparable or incomparable measure?
(Q6)  Does it require a lot of data from individuals who are being assessed?
In the discussion above, we saw that Benjamin et al.’s measure and the ICECAP-A make 
the following choices (Table 2):
While Benjamin et al. only minimally restrict preferences and aim at a measure that is 
ordinal and incomparable between individuals, and is relatively data-demanding, the 
ICECAP-A measure restricts the objects over which individuals have preferences to five capa-
bilities, is cardinal and interpersonally comparable, and is not very data-demanding. However, 
both use group-level preferences, even though both submit that their methods can be used 
for substrata of the population, rather than the population as a whole, to get closer to the 
individual level.
 The first three considerations on the list relate to the theoretical commitments of the 
approach. While neither approach truly provides a welfare measure that respects individual 
preference, Benjamin et al. do go at great lengths to leave the aspects over which individuals 
can have preferences as open as possible, while the ICECAP-A only captures preferences 
over five abstract capabilities. While the ICECAP-A allows for a non-linear relationship 
between the evaluated welfare goods and utility, neither approach is able to accommodate 
non-linear interactions between welfare goods.
Questions 4 and 5 determine how useful the measure ultimately is for policy-makers. 
While the ICECAP-A is (plausibly) taken by its developers to represent a cardinal and 
Table 2. methodological aspects of the two preference-satisfaction measures.
Benjamin et al. (2014) ICEPCAP-A
unrestricted preferences? yes (or minimally restricted) no
restricted function form? linearity restriction and no 
interactions
no interaction, but no linearity 
restriction 
individual preferences or preferences 
pooled across individuals?
Pooled Pooled
ordinal or cardinal? ordinal cardinal
interpersonally comparable? incomparable comparable
data-demanding? relatively data-demanding not very data-demanding
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12   W. VAN DER DEIJL
interpersonally comparable measure of welfare, Benjamin et al.’s measure only captures 
ordinal changes in welfare that are not interpersonally comparable. While Benjamin et al. 
explicitly have a policy-context in mind when they consider the application of their measure, 
it is unclear how their measure can be helpful in guiding welfare-driven policies. Because 
of the limited comparability, it is neither able to make utilitarian judgments about the 
changes in aggregate welfare, nor is it able to identify relevant differences in welfare between 
individuals.
 The final question is about feasibility. As Benjamin et al. note, even under restrictive 
assumptions, fully comparing the different possible combinations of 129 welfare aspects 
leads to such a large number of comparisons that this would be completely infeasible to do 
for each individual, and, despite the much lower number of welfare aspects, the same applies 
the ICECAP-A. But, in light of the pragmatic choice to group preferences, the ICECAP-A 
strongly limits the data-demandingness; and so does the Benjamin et al. measure to a more 
limited extent.
The problem is thus as follows.15 A preference-satisfaction measure of welfare that remains 
faithful to its theoretical commitments does not limit the preference space in such a way 
that significant kinds of preferences that people may hold are not represented (Q1). Moreover, 
it evaluates a person’s welfare by her own preferences, and not those of others (Q3). In order 
to allow for the preferences people may have, this would also involve allowing for non-linear 
relationships between welfare goods and welfare, as well as non-linear interactions between 
welfare goods (Q2). In order for a measure to allow for making interesting comparisons, it 
should be interpersonally comparable (Q5) or cardinal (Q4), and ideally both. However, 
achieving each of these things increases the data-demandingness of measures. In particular, 
combining (Q1) with (Q3) is highly data-demanding, as there are simply a lot of dimensions 
on which lives may be different that can be relevant for welfare, and this means that there 
are a lot of different possible combinations of such dimensions that make up welfare. For 
every dimension added to the set of wi, the number of possible welfare states increases 
exponentially. The ICECAP-A is based on five dimensions that may vary over four different 
levels. This leads to 1024 (45) possible values of wi that should be ranked in order to get at a 
full preference-map. In case of Benjamin et al., if we assume that each of the 129 dimensions 
can vary over four different levels, we get at a total of 4.63 * 1077 possible states of the world 
to compare. However, even if the individualistic commitment is dropped (as is done by both 
Benjamin et al. and the ICECAP-A), there are still significant data constraints that prohibit 
fulfilling all the other features. As we saw, adding the possibility of non-linear relationships 
and information needed to make measures comparable and cardinal only increases the 
informational load needed to come to an individual level measure of welfare.
It is highly contentious whether a cardinal interpersonally comparable welfare measure 
could exist in practice (e.g. Binmore, 2009b; Hausman, 1995; List, 2003), but if so, a calibrated 
scale would be needed to standardize the preference ranking (as the ICECAP-A does). 
However, this requires that we do not only evaluate changes of welfare at the present level 
of w, but that we construct a full preference-map that will help us indicate how far away we 
are from calibrated points (e.g. 0 and 1). This again, raises the number of hypothetical choices 
a particular individual would have to make even further. Staying faithful to theoretical com-
mitments and providing a useful policy measure are thus heavily data-demanding features 
of a welfare measure based on preference-satisfactionism.
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 This problem is explicitly acknowledged by both groups of authors when it comes to the 
question whether a measure should use individual or population-level preferences. Benjamin 
et al. motivate their choice to use group-preferences rather than individual level preferences 
explicitly by referring to avoiding data-overdemandingness, and Flynn et al. (2015) also note 
that even with five welfare dimensions ‘it was not feasible to provide respondents with all 
1024 possible scenarios’. In both cases the measure can be individualized, but only at the 
cost of being over-demanding to individuals who are being assessed.16
 A measure that requires individuals to make thousands of hypothetical comparisons in 
order to get at an individual measure of welfare is infeasible; in order to reduce this number, 
theoretical commitments of preference-satisfactionism, policy-relevance, or some aspects 
of both need to be sacrificed. Hence, as feasibility is the hardest constraint for researchers 
wanting to provide a helpful measure for policy purposes, a trade-off needs to be made 
between the different aspects of theoretical faithfulness and policy-relevance. Without sug-
gesting a correct way to make such trade-offs, it should be clear that such trade-offs are 
steep. Neither of the two measures ultimately stays faithful to the individualism of prefer-
ence-satisfactionism. Furthermore, Benjamin et al.’s measure falls short of providing a poli-
cy-relevant measure, while the ICECAP-A heavily restrict the space of valuation.
5. Conclusion
For theoretical reasons, the possibility that welfare could be measured by means of a com-
parable index of general preference-satisfaction has for a long time been seen with a skep-
tical attitude. Such attitude may have been overly skeptical. The theoretical frameworks of 
both reviewed approaches show that at a concrete level plausible pragmatic choices can be 
made that result in indices of utility. However, in light of methodological considerations, a 
preference measure of welfare falls short either in terms of normative and theoretical com-
mitments, in terms of policy-relevance, or faces the charge that it is too demanding to be 
put into practice.
 So, to what extent can welfare be measured with a preference-based utility index? While 
a preference-based method of indexing welfare connects closely to economic theory, the 
trade-offs identified in this article pose a stark challenge to this possibility. However, the 
trade-offs also offer an opportunity to bring different approach to welfare measurement 
closer together. For example, by restricting the space of possible preferences in a wel-
fare-measure, the developers of the ICECAP have incorporated insights from the more objec-
tive capability approach. While this may make their approach less attractive to a pure 
preference-satisfactionist, it should make the approach more appealing to capability schol-
ars. If indeed, a preference-measure needs to let go of its unrestrictedness, the usage of 
insights from alternative approaches – such as the capability approach and objective list 
theories – may be a way to build a synthesis in the ongoing debate on how to measure 
welfare.
Notes
1.  It similarly has been fiercely defended against the charge that happiness measures are not 
cardinal (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004), and that it does not capture what it is intended to 
capture (see for example Alexandrova & Haybron, 2016; Diener, Lucas, Schimmack, & Helliwell, 
2009; van der Deijl, 2017; and Veenhoven, 2012 for a critical appraisal).
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2.  Particularly in the context of policy, it would arguably be problematic if governments would 
aim to satisfy preferences that are racist (Heathwood, 2010; Hausman, 2012, ch. 7). I would like 
to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
3.  A difficult question is whether a preferentist account of welfare should include other-regarding 
preferences or not, and whether this counts as a formal criterion. Both positions have arguments 
in favor. The argument does not rely on this question.
4.  In case of qualitative hedonism, e contains a variety of versions of pleasure, in which case the 
relationship, between wi and wi is also more complex.
5.  The capability approach, merely limits wi to functionings and capabilities, without specifying 
fi, or wi in any substantive sense (Sen, 1985).
6.  To cohere with the rest of the formulations in this article the name of the index, Wbhks,i is my 
own input, the rest comes directly from Benjamin et al. (2014, p. 2704).
7.  The extent to which it minimizes paternalism is arguably still more restricted than necessary. 
It still excludes many possible aspects people may have preferences about, such as the status 
of the great barrier reef, that our children are successful in life, or having aesthetic experiences, 
just to name a few.
8.  A main problem is mentioned, but a further issue is that this methodology is blind to the 
distinction between conceptual overlap and overlap due to causal relationships. To a person 
who cares about income, education and income may overlap in terms of preferences (due to 
expected income increase education may provide), but need not think of the two as similar 
concepts. A second issue is that Benjamin et al. assume that people’s interpretation of concepts 
is fixed. This is dubious and, in the context of developing conceptual overlap, problematic. 
A person who is asked to make a trade-off between ‘The happiness of your family’ and ‘The 
amount of pleasure in your life’ will probably understand happiness to be something different 
than someone who is asked to make a trade-off between ‘The happiness of your family’ and ‘The 
overall well-being of you and your family’. Moreover, the approach is highly data-demanding, 
adding to the concern discussed below.
9.  One way in which this can be done is asking respondents to make time-trade-offs between 
health states (others are using standard gambles or visual analogue scales). Under the 
assumption that utility components of time and health states are separable, one may assess 
when a particular individual is indifferent between living for 10 years in a bad health state 
compared to living X years in a perfect health state. If the perfect health state is assigned the 
value 1, we know that x/10 must be the value of QALY of living for a year in the bad health state.
10.  Both Al-Janabi et al. (2012), as well as Flynn et al. (2015) stress that they aim to get at a ‘general’, 
‘generic’, or ‘overall’ (2015, p. 267) welfare measure that is not limited to health itself, but quality 
of life in general. However, as one anonymous referee pointed out, Al-Janabi et al. (2012) do 
exclude one item that people care about – ‘the ability to live in a good or ‘‘just’’ world’ (74) – on 
grounds of lying outside of the scope for policy, while running the risk of overshadowing other 
capabilities. While this may be interpreted as a pragmatic argument, it can also be interpreted 
as showing the authors are ultimately interested in a measure that is so general as to capture all 
that affects wellbeing within policy. This is thus not the exact same thing as general well-being 
itself. However, as this concept is still highly general, and as Benjamin et al’s also maintain this 
policy focus, the conclusion below will not hinge on this distinction.
11.  The remainder mainly considers the ICECAP-A measure as a preference-measure of welfare and 
identifies weaknesses of it as such. However, this is not the only way to understand this measure, 
and does not appear to be the way the developers themselves see the ICECAP-A. The authors 
instrumentally use preferences as a proxy of valuation. As the ICECAP-A is a capability measure, 
and uses population preferences a proxy of what individuals have ‘reason to value’ (Sen, 1999), 
many of the criticism may not apply. The ICECAP-A measure may very well be among the most 
defensible measures of welfare, both in terms of normative and empirical adequacy, if it is not 
seen as a preference-measure of welfare. The same arguments apply to a similar measure, the 
Adult Social Care Outcomes Toolkit (ASCOT; Forder & Caiels, 2011). However, while this measure 
takes on a more explicit utility-based framework, it aims to measure ‘social outcome’ or ‘care-
related quality of life’ rather than well-being more generally.
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12.  The methodology is based on asking respondents to compare well-being states – combinations 
of different levels of the 5 dimensions of the ICECAP-A measure. The estimates used to scale 
each dimension are based on the conditional probability a well-being state is considered best 
(or worst) given the attribute level of the dimension.
13.  The authors are not very clear on the exact interpretation of their measure. They ultimately 
present their weights as a ‘tariff’ to be used in economic valuations. It clearly presents the value 
of wellbeing states to each individual. It is not clear however, whether the authors believe there 
to be a distinction between the value of a person’s wellbeing state and a wellbeing state itself. 
While the two concepts appear to be the same in this context, the language the authors use 
avoids putting the two at par.
14.  The authors themselves see the estimated weights as having value nation-wide in the UK, but 
also believe that particular contexts may require different weights.
15.  As one anonymous referee pointed out, it may be argued that the problem may be held 
against any measure of welfare. However, while there are a variety of problems one can list 
with respect to the appropriateness of SWB measures of welfare, data-demandingness is 
not one of them. Because SWB assumes people are good evaluators of their own happiness, 
asking a single question is sufficient to estimate their welfare. This, thus neither requires the 
pooling of individuals, nor restricting specific types of happiness. Purely objective pluralist 
measures do face a difficult weighting problem: how should the different goods on a list be 
valued in different lives. This problem is similar to the problem discussed here, and objectivists 
about welfare generally do not formulate a clear answer to this question. However, the issue is 
different (perhaps worse) than the problem discussed here. Preferentists do have a theoretical 
solution: we need to know what people (would) want, in order to solve the weighing problem. 
As the argument shows, however, this requires so much information, that it is not realistically 
feasible.
16.  Similarly, developers of the ASCOT write: ‘There are practical limits on the number of indicators 
any preference-based measure can utilize, mainly due to the limitations of preference 
elicitation techniques. They include the difficulty respondents have in ranking over many 
different attributes and the tractability of statistical analysis of these data’ (Forder & Caiels, 
2011, p. 1768).
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